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Abstract. In this article, we make an attempt to operationalize the notion of 
identity so as to justify the claim about its potential as an analytic tool for 
investigating learning.  According to our definition, identity is a set of reifying, 
significant, endorsable stories about a person. The subsequent analysis of the 
dynamics of narratives makes it clear that identities, even if individually told, 
are products of a collective storytelling. Our main claim is that learning may be 
thought of as closing the gap between actual identity and designated identity, 
two particular sets of reifying significant stories about the learner, endorsed by 
this learner. The theoretical substantiation of this assertion is accompanied by 
vignettes from a study in which mathematical learning practices of a group of 
17 year old immigrant students from the former Soviet Union newly arrived in 
Israel were compared to those of native Israelis. 
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These days, the term identity is prominently present in both scholarly and public 
discourses. The time-honored notion is experiencing an obvious renaissance, with its 
comeback even more impressive than its original appearance. Once a part of 
specialized psychological vocabularies, it now enjoys attention of researchers from a 
wide range of social and humanistic sciences, including sociology, cultural studies, 
anthropology, and history. Educational research is no exception. As aptly put by 
Diane Hoffman,  “Identity has become the bread and butter of our educational diet” 
(Hoffman, 1998, p. 324).  
This article is devoted to reflections on the emerging educational discourse on 
identity. Our focus is on the reasons for its current popularity, on its present 
shortcomings, and on the conceptual work that has yet to be done before the notion 
of identity can fulfill its promise as an “analytic lens for educational research” (Gee, 
2001).  The decision to engage in this conceptual debate has been spurred by our 
own experience. In our recent empirical study (Prusak, 2003), in which we compared 
mathematical learning practices of a group of 17 year old immigrant students from 
the former Soviet Union to those of the native Israelis, we opted for speaking in terms 
of identity while trying to make sense of salient differences between the two groups. 
And yet, after many hours spent in libraries and on the web, we concluded that we 
would not be successful unless we came up with a definition of identity more 
operational than those to be found in the current literature.  Lengthy deliberations led 
us to the decision to equate identities with stories about persons. No, no mistake 
here: We did not say that identities were finding their expression in stories – we said 
they were stories. 
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In what follows, we precede the more detailed presentation of this definition 
and its subsequent justification with an analysis of the reasons for our dissatisfaction 
with other current approaches. Later, we argue that the narrative rendering of 
identity, while not as ‘reductionist’ as it may sound, leads to immediate theoretical 
insights inspired by the burgeoning research on human communication. Finally, we 
use our own cross-cultural study on learning to demonstrate that equating identities 
with stories makes the notion well suited to its designated role as a tool for 
educational research.
While doing all this, we do not aspire to say what has not been already said, 
or at least hinted at, by others. Rather, we wish to make things more explicit and fully 
operational, so as to be able to use the language of identity in a responsible way, 
while following theoretical consequences of this use all way down. At this point in 
time such action seems to be urgently needed. Far-reaching ramifications of the 
present identity upheaval may easily be overlooked due to the fact that our language 
tends to resist innovations. Because of their transparency, vocabularies and 
grammars refuse to lend themselves in a timely manner to our attempts to de-
familiarize the familiar. In order to be able to address conceptual pitfalls likely to arise 
when new ideas are already under way but the old ones have not yet disappeared, 
we have to pause for a moment and turn our attention to the discourse itself. 
Defining identity as narrative
Why talk about identity?
The new prominence of the old concept of identity raises many questions: Why this 
sudden revival of the long-standing interest? How is the notion of identity different 
from more traditional terms, such as character, nature, and personality, and how is it 
connected to other notions, such as attitudes, conceptions, and beliefs? 
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Why one needs identity depends on the researcher’s questions, and these 
questions may not be the same for a sociologist, cultural theorist, and educational 
researcher. This said, all these different types of research do have one overarching 
theme in common: the focus of the investigator’s attention is on humans in action and 
on mechanisms underlying this action. More specifically, the leading query is why 
different individuals act differently in the same situations and why all those 
differences notwithstanding, there is often a distinct family resemblance between 
different individuals’ actions. 
It is reasonable to assume that the present tendency to answer this latter 
question in terms of identity is related to the general sociocultural turn in human 
sciences. The notions of personality, character, and nature, being irrevocably tainted 
with connotations of natural givens and biological determinants, are ill-suited to the 
sociocultural project.  In contrast, identity, which is thought of as man-made and as 
constantly created and re-created in  interactions with others (Holland & Lave, 2003; 
Bauman, 1996; Roth, 2004), seems just perfect for the task. Together with the 
acceptance of identity as the pivotal notion of the new research discourse comes the 
declaration about humans as active agents who play decisive roles in determining 
the dynamics of social life and in shaping individual activities. 
Naturally, this emancipatory message  does not come without a price:  The 
freer we are to decide about ourselves and the worlds around us, the greater our 
responsibility. In sociology and in cultural theory, the notion of identity proves helpful 
in dealing with issues of power and of personal and collective responsibilities for 
individual lives. In particular, identity features prominently whenever one addresses 
the question of how collective discourses shape personal worlds and how individual 
voices combine into the voice of a community. Within this context, the term 
identifying is to be understood as the activity in which one uses common resources to 
create a unique, individually-tailored combination. 
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The question of mechanisms through which the collective and the common 
enter individual activities lies also at the center of the educational research on 
learning.  Cross-cultural and cross-situational investigations on what and how people 
know as a result of learning have furnished ample evidence for the existence of 
cultural differences (for the case of mathematical learning, see e.g.  Lave, 1988; 
Saxe, 1991; Nunes, Schliemann, and Carracher, 1993; Beach, 1995; Cole, 1996; 
Stigler & Hiebert, 1999; Ma, 1999). According to John Ogbu (1992), “[w]hat the 
children bring to school – their communities’ cultural models of understanding of 
“social realities” and the educational strategies that they, their families, and their 
communities use or do not use in seeking education are as important as within-
school factors” (p. 5). This said, educational research has yet a long way to go before 
it answers the question of how the cultural shaping of learning takes place.  While 
speaking about “cultural production of educated person”, Levinson and Holland 
(1996) observe that in spite of the recent advances in the research on learning, 
cultural diversity, and equity, the “deeper, structural context of cultural production of 
school failure remained obscure and largely unaddressed” (p. 8). The same can be 
said about the production of success, which was the focus of our own study. Our 
interest in the question of how the broadly conceived sociocultural context affects 
individual learning was occasioned by the recent massive immigration from the 
former Soviet Union to Israel.1 More specifically, it was triggered by a spontaneous, 
yet-to-be-tested observation that a disproportionately large portion of this particular 
group of immigrants could pride itself with impressive results in mathematics, and not 
just in school, but also in national and international mathematical competitions.2 We 
began asking ourselves whether there was anything unique about the immigrant 
students’ mathematics learning and if there was, how this uniqueness could be 
accounted for.
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We believe that the notion of identity is a perfect candidate for the role of “the 
missing link” in the researchers’ story of the complex dialectic between learning and 
its sociocultural context. We thus concur with the growingly popular idea of replacing 
the traditional discourse on schooling with the talk about “construction of identities” 
(Lave & Wenger, 191, p. 53) or about the “longer-term agenda of identity building” 
(Lemke, 2000; cf. Nasir & Saxe, 2003). And yet, we also believe that the notion of 
identity cannot become truly useful unless it is provided with an operational definition. 
What is missing in the current educational discourse on identity? 
As a preparation to the critical analysis of the current discourse on identity it may be 
useful to give thought to certain well-documented weaknesses of such widely-used 
motivational notions as beliefs or attitudes which, on the face of it, can compete with 
identity for the role of conceptual bridge between learning and its cultural setting. 
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Fundamental objections to the notion of belief were raised by many writers, 
notably by Geertz (1973), who asserted unacceptability of this concept when claiming 
that it “[married] extreme subjectivism to extreme formalism, with the expected result: 
an explosion of debate as to whether particular analyses… reflect what [people] 
“really” think…” (p. 11). The issue at stake was that of the essentialist vision of 
beliefs, one that assumed their discourse-independent existence without specifying 
where and how one could get hold of them.  A similar complaint seemed to underlie 
Herbert Blumer’s “critical assessment of the concept of attitude as a tool for study 
and analysis of human conduct” (Blumer, 1969, p. 90). According to Blumer, 
whatever one’s approach to the notion of attitude, this notion was not operational, 
that is, it regularly failed the three necessary conditions for the concept’s applicability 
in research: The available descriptions did not specify what one should look at while 
trying to pinpoint attitudes, they did not say what should not be considered as a 
member of the class, and they did not enable accumulation of knowledge. The 
immediate reason for all these failings was, once again, a certain essentialist tenet, 
namely “the idea that the tendency to act [precedes and] determines that act” (ibid). 
As with the case of belief, the assumption about intention (or tendency) that exists in 
some unspecified ‘pure’ form independently of, and prior to, the human action was a 
dubious basis for any empirical study.   
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Back to our theme, we now wish to claim that although promising and 
potentially better-adjusted to the role of a “tool for the study of human conduct,”  the 
notion of identity cannot be declared free from similar weaknesses unless its 
definition is spelled out and proved operational. Such a definition has yet to be found. 
In the current literature the use of the word identity is rarely preceded by any 
explanations. In the absence of a definition, the reader is led to believe that identity is 
one of those self-evident notions that, whether reflectively or instinctively, arise from 
one’s first-hand, unmediated experience. The influential publications by Lave and by 
Wenger are representative in this respect. Although identity is one of these writers’ 
pivotal ideas, no conceptual preparations precede such sentences as “Learning… 
implies becoming a different person… learning involves the construction of identity” 
(Lave & Wenger, 1991, p. 53) or “The experience of identity in practice is a way of 
being in the world.” (Wenger, 1998, p. 151). 
A few defining attempts that can be found in the recent literature may be a 
promising beginning. For instance, Gee (2001) says: 
Being recognized as a certain ‘kind of person,’  in a given context, is what I mean… 
by ‘identity’. (p. 99). 
Later, the author offers a more elaborate description:
Discourses can give us one way to define what I called earlier a person’s “core 
identity.” Each person has had a unique trajectory though “Discursive space.” That is, 
he or she has, through time, in a certain order, had specific experiences within 
specific discourses (i.e., been recognized, at a time and place, one way and not 
another), some recurring and others not. This trajectory and the person’s own 
narrativization (Mishler, 2000) of it are what constitute his or her (never fully formed or 
always potentially changing) “core identity”. (p. 111).
The motif of “person’s own narrativization” recurs in the description proposed by 
Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner, and Cain (1998), even if formulated in different terms:
People tell others who they are, but even more importantly, they tell themselves and 
they try to act as though they are who they say they are. These self-understandings, 
especially those with strong emotional resonance for the teller, are what we refer to 
as identities. (p. 3)
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If we said that all these are “promising beginnings” rather than fully 
satisfactory definitions, this is because of one feature, common to them all: They rely 
on the expression “who one is” or its equivalents. Even Gee’s second offering cannot 
be understood without it: The words “being a certain kind of person” are used in the 
author’s explanation of the term Discourse, which is pivotal to his second definition.3 
Unfortunately, neither Gee nor Holland and her colleagues make it clear how one can 
decide about “who” or “what kind of person” a given individual is. 
At a closer look, the talk about “being a certain kind of person” may be 
pushing us exactly into the trap that most of the authors who use the notion of 
identity want to escape: Through its very syntax, the expression implies that one’s 
present status is, in a sense, extra-discursive and independent of the individual’s 
actions. Sentences built around the idea of “being a kind of person” sound timeless 
and agentless. As such, these sentences seem to be saying that there is a thing 
beyond one’s actions that stays the same when the actions go on, and also that there 
is a thing beyond discourse that remains unchanged whoever is talking about it. Such 
an essentialist vision of identity is as untenable as it is harmful. It is untenable 
because it leaves us without a clue as to where we are supposed to look for this 
elusive “essence” that remains the same throughout person’s actions. It is potentially 
harmful because the reified version of one’s former actions that comes in the form of 
nouns or adjectives describing this person’s “identity” acts as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. As agents of continuity and perpetuation, the descriptors that outlast action 
exclude and disable just as much as they enable and create (Ben-Yehuda, Lavy, 
Linchevski, Sfard, 2003).4 Although contrary to the intentions of the authors quoted 
above, these interpretations cannot be barred as long as the words “being a kind of 
person” remain the centerpiece of the definition of identity. The question we are now 
facing is how to define identity so as to make the notion operational, immune to 
undesirable connotations, and in tune with the claim about identities as man-made 
and collectively shaped rather than given.     
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How to define identity? 
Gee’s and Holland et al.’s definitions of identity, although rather unlikely to pass 
Blumer’s test of admissibility, have an important insight to offer: By foregrounding 
“person’s own narrativizations” and “telling who one is,”  they link the notion of 
identity to the activity of communication, with the latter term conceived broadly, as 
referring also to a self-dialogue, that is, to thinking. Together with many others (e.g. 
Hall 1996; Gee, 2001; Gonzales, 1999) we readily embrace the idea of  identity-
making as communicational practice, and thereby reject the notion of identities as 
extra-discursive entities which we merely “represent” or “describe” while talking. 
Perhaps the most obvious identifying technique consists in replacing the talk 
about actions with talk about states or, more specifically, in substituting utterances 
about doing with reifying sentences about being or having.5 The reifying effect follows 
directly from the particular syntax of the “is-sentences”, such as 
º She is an able student (has a gift) 
as opposed to 
º In the majority of school tests and activities so far she regularly did well 
and attained above average scores.
In modern societies we have an unbounded array of institutional means for 
describing “who one is”: we do it with the help of grades, test results, certificates, 
passports, diagnoses, licenses, diplomas, titles, ranks –  and this is just the 
beginning of the long list. In fact, almost any social situation seems a good 
opportunity for reifying.
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Why this overpowering proclivity for “is-sentences”? Paradoxically, the reason 
may be exactly the same as the one that formerly evoked our concern: We cannot do 
without the is-sentences because of their reifying quality. Our relations with the world 
and with other people are fluid, sensitive to our every action. Metaphorically 
speaking, identifying is an attempt to overcome the change by collapsing a video clip 
into a generic snapshot.  The use of is-sentences that do the job of “freezing of the 
picture” and turn properties of actions into properties of actors is grounded in the 
experience-engendered expectation, indeed hope, that in spite of the ongoing 
change, much of what we see now will repeat itself in a similar situation tomorrow. 
Based of this assumption, identity talk makes us able to cope with new situations in 
terms of our past experience and gives us tools to plan for the future. 
In concert with the vision of identifying as a discursive activity, we suggest 
that identities may be defined as collections of stories about persons or, more 
specifically, as those narratives about individuals that are reifying, endorsable and 
significant. The reifying quality comes with the use of verbs such as be, have or can 
rather than do, and with the adverbs always, never, usually, etc. that stress 
repetitiveness of actions. A story about a person counts as endorsable if the identity-
builder, when asked, would say that it faithfully reflects the state of affairs in the 
world. A narrative is regarded as significant if any change in it is likely to affect the 
storyteller’s feelings about the identified person. The most significant stories are often 
those that imply one’s memberships in, or exclusions from, various communities. 
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As a narrative, every identifying story may be represented by the triple BAC, 
where A is the identified person, B is the author and C the recipient.  Within this 
rendering it becomes clear that multiple identities exist for any person. Stories about 
a given individual may be quite different one from another, sometimes even 
contradictory. Although unified by a family resemblance, they depend both in their 
details and in their general purport on who is telling the story and for whom this story 
is meant. What a person endorses as true about herself may be not what others see 
enacted. To ensure that this last point never disappears from our eyes, we denote 
the different identities with names that indicate the relation between the hero of the 
story, the storyteller, and the recipient: AAC, a story told by the identified person 
herself, will be called A’s first-person identity (1st P);  BAA, a story told to its main 
character, will be named  second-person identity (2nd P); finally, BAC, a story told by a 
third party to a third party, will be referred to as third-person identity (3rd P). Among all 
these, there is one special identity that comprises the reifying, endorsable, significant 
1st P stories the storyteller addresses to herself (AAA). It is this last type of stories that 
is usually intended when the word identity is used unassisted by additional 
specifications. Being a part of our ongoing conversation with ourselves, the first-
person self-told identities are likely to have the most immediate impact upon our 
actions.
What are the merits and possible pitfalls of the narratively defined identity?
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With the narrative definition, human agency and the dynamic nature of identity are 
brought to the fore, whereas most of the disadvantages of traditional approaches 
seem to disappear. The focus of the researcher’s attention is now on things said by 
identifiers and no essentialist claims are made about narratives as mere “windows” to 
an intangible, indefinable entity. As stories, identities are human-made and not God-
given, they have authors and recipients, they are collectively shaped even if 
individually told, and they can change according to the authors’ and recipient’ 
perceptions and needs. As discursive constructs, they are also reasonably 
accessible and investigable.
For all these obvious advantages, one may claim that “reducing” identity to 
narratives undermines its potential as a sense-making tool. Story is a text, the critic 
would say, and identity is also, maybe even predominantly, an experience. Perhaps 
the most outspoken proponent of this position is Wenger (1998) who says that 
identity “is not, in its essence, discursive or reflective.” And he adds: “We often think 
about our identities as self-images because we talk about ourselves and each other 
– and even think about ourselves and each other – in words. These words are 
important, no doubt, but they are not the full, lived experience of engagement in 
practice.” (p. 151). 
 Although we agree that identities originate in daily activities and in the 
“experience of engagement”, it would be a category mistake to claim that these 
characteristics disqualify our narrative rendering of identity. Indeed, it is our vision of 
our own or other people’s experiences, and not these experiences as such, that 
constitutes identities. Rather than viewing identities as entities residing in the world 
itself, our narrative definition presents them as discursive counterparts of one’s lived 
experiences (this said, it is important to stress that we do not claim that identities 
“faithfully recount” the identity-engendering experiences; together with Wittgenstein 
(1953) we consider the very request to “convey an experience” as not just 
unworkable, but as conceptually untenable.)  
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Further, while we readily admit that some very real experiences prompt us to 
say that we have a “sense of identity”, we also wish to reverse the causal relation 
implied by such a saying: We claim that the experience that we describe as a “sense 
of identity” is not the primary source of identifying storytelling but rather is this 
activity’s natural outcome. The ubiquity and repetitiveness of identifying narratives 
about us make them so familiar and self-evident to us that we eventually become 
able to endorse or reject new statements about us in a direct, non-reflective way. 
Such immediacy of decision, when no rationalization is necessary to make us certain 
of our choices, is the general defining characteristic of the situations in which we say 
that we have “a sense of ” something.  In the case of decisions regarding physical 
activity, this immediacy results from our familiarity with the material objects on which 
the actions are performed. Thus, for example, we claim having “a good sense of a 
terrain” if we are able to find our ways through the given physical space in an instant, 
“without thinking”. The use of the expression “sense of” in conjunction with “identity” 
is an act of metaphorical projection into a discourse on experiences that cannot be 
accounted for by a reference to material objects. The phrase comes to this latter 
discourse together with all its objectifying entailments: the implied dichotomy 
between the “sense” and its object makes us believe in the primacy of the entity 
called “identity” over the experience of immediacy, familiarity, and direct recognition 
that underlies our identifying storytelling.    
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 Another question to explore while assessing the proposed definition is 
whether our narrative identity can be useful in research in spite of the fact that 
different identity-builders do not always tell the same story. Indeed, actors’ self-
referential remarks may be at odds with those made by an observer and may vary 
depending on the listener, sometimes contradicting a version presented by, or to, 
somebody else (adjusting one’s story to listeners is not a sign of insincerity but rather 
stems from the natural human need for solidarity and effective communication.) Let 
us thus clarify that it is the activity of identifying rather than its end product that is of 
interest to the researcher. In studies that make use of the notion, the focus is not on 
identities as such but rather on the complex dialectic between identity-building and 
other human activities. Thus, while letting ourselves be guided by the narrative vision 
of identity we are not afraid of missing anything that is “out there” or of not being able 
to pin down the “true referent” of the term “identity” that waits to be captured by a 
better description. Narratives that constitute one’s identity, being an important factor 
in shaping this person’s actions, will be useful in research even if they communicate 
one’s experiences only as well as human words can tell. 
Toward a narrative theory of identity
Since questions about identity can now be translated into queries about the dynamics 
of narratives, and since this latter phenomenon is amenable to empirical study, the 
narrative definition may be expected to catalyze a rich theory of identity. Much can 
now be said about identities simply by drawing on what is known about human 
communication and on how narratives interact one with another. In this part of the 
article we present some initial, analytically derived thoughts on how identities come 
into being and develop. 
Actual and designated identities
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The reifying, significant narratives about a person can be split into two subsets: 
actual identity, consisting of stories about the actual state of affairs, and designated 
identity, composed of narratives presenting a state of affairs which, for one reason or 
another, is expected to be the case, if not now then in the future.  Actual identities are 
usually told in present tense and are formulated as factual assertions.  Statements 
such as I am a good driver, I have an average IQ, I am army officer are 
representative examples. Designated identities are stories believed to have the 
potential to become a part of one’s actual identity. They can be recognized by their 
use of the future tense or of words that express wish, commitment, obligation or 
necessity, such as should, ought, have to, must, want, can/cannot, etc. Narratives 
such as I want to be a doctor or I have to be a better person are typical of designated 
identities. 
The scenarios that constitute designated identities are not necessarily 
desired, but are always perceived as binding. One may expect to “become a certain 
type of person,” that is, to have some stories applicable to oneself, for various 
reasons: because the person thinks that what these stories are telling is good for her, 
because these are the kinds of stories that seem appropriate for a person of her 
sociocultural origins or just because they present the kind of future she is designated 
to have according to others, in particular to those in the position of authority and 
power. More often than not, however, designated identities are not a matter of 
deliberate rational choice. A person may be led to endorse certain narratives about 
herself without realizing that these are “just stories” and that they have alternatives. 
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Designated identities give direction to one’s actions and influence one’s 
deeds to a great extent, sometimes in ways that escape any rationalization. For 
example, a person for whom being a democrat is a part of her designated identity 
may refuse to join any activity initiated by republicans regardless of the nature of this 
activity and of its rationale. For every person, some kinds of stories have more 
impact than some others. Critical stories are those core elements, which, if changed, 
would make one feel as if one’s whole identity changed: The person’s ‘sense of 
identity’ would be shaken and she would lose her ability to tell in the immediate, 
decisive manner which stories about her are endorsable and which are not. A 
perceived persistent gap between actual and designated identities, especially if it 
involves critical elements, is likely to generate a sense of unhappiness. 
Where do designated identities come from?  The role of significant narrators
Being a narrative, the designated identity, although probably more inert and less 
context-dependent than actual identities, is neither inborn nor entirely immutable. 
Like any other story, it is created from narratives that are floating around. One 
individual cannot count as the sole author even of those stories that sound as if 
nobody has told them before. 
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To put it differently, identities are products of discursive diffusion – of our 
proclivity to recycle strips of things said by others even if we are unaware of these 
texts’ origins. Paraphrasing Mikhail Bakhtin, we may say that any narrative reveals to 
us stories of others.6 Identities coming from different narrators and being addressed 
at different audiences are in a constant interaction and feed one into another. These 
stories would not be effective in their relation-shaping task if not for their power to 
contribute to the addressees’ own narratives about themselves and about others. 
Thus, the people to whom our stories are told, as well as those who tell stories about 
us, may be tacit co-authors of our own designated identities. Either by animating 
other speakers or by converting their stories about us to the first person, we 
incorporate our 2nd and 3rd person identities into our self-addressed designated 
identities. 
Another important sources of one’s own identity are stories about others. 
There are many possible reasons for turning such narratives into first person and 
incorporating them into one’s own designated identity. Thus, for example, the 
identity-builder may be attracted either to the heroes of these narratives or to their 
authors. Another reason may be one’s conviction about being “made” in the image of 
a certain person (e.g., of socially deprived parents, alcoholic father or academically 
successful mother) and “doomed” to a similar life.  Whether a story told by somebody 
else does or does not make it into one’s own designated identity depends, among 
other things, on how significant the storyteller is in the eyes of the identified person. 
Significant narrators, the owners of the most influential voices, are carriers of those 
cultural messages that will have the greatest impact on one’s actions.
How do designated identities develop and change? The role of narrative diffusion 
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The fact that one of the most important sources of our designated identities are 
narratives authored by others is perhaps the main reason for these identities’ relative 
inertness. Stories once told tend to get life of their own and, while “changing hands,” 
stop being subject to either their author’s or their hero’s creative interventions. 
Changing designated identities that have been formed in childhood is a particularly 
difficult task. 
Institutional narratives, such as those called diagnoses, certificates, 
nominations, diplomas or licenses (compare Gee’s concept of I-identity; Gee 2001) 
have a particular capacity to supplant stories that have been a part of one’s 
designated identity so far. In addition, although narrative osmosis goes mainly from 
designated to actual identities, one cannot exclude the possibility of influence that 
travels in the opposite direction.  As implied by the common wisdom that  “success 
begets success and failure begets failure,” stories of victories and losses have a 
particular tendency for self-perpetuation.  On their way into designated identities, 
tales of one’s repeated success are likely to reincarnate into stories of this person’s 
special “aptitude”, “gift” or “talent”, whereas the motifs of repeated failure would take 
the form of narratives on anything from “slowness” to “permanent disability.” 
Learning as closing the gap between actual and designated identities
It is now not unreasonable to conjecture that identities are crucial to learning. With 
their tendency to act as self-fulfilling prophecies, identities are likely to play a critical 
role in determining whether the process of learning will end with what counts as 
success or with what is regarded as failure. 
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And there is more. These days, in our times of incessant change, when the 
pervasive fluidity of most social memberships and of identities themselves is a 
constant source of fears and insecurities, the role of learning in shaping identities 
may be greater than ever. Unlike a few centuries ago, when people were born into 
“who they were”, everything now seems possible and only insufficiencies of 
imagination may be the reason for the down-to-earth nature of the majority of 
common stories about “who one is supposed to be”.
Learning is our primary means for making reality in the image of fantasies. 
The object of learning may be the craft of cooking, the art of appearing in media or 
the skill of solving mathematical problems, depending on what counts as critical to 
one’s identity. Whatever the case, learning is often the only hope for those who wish 
to close a critical gap between their actual and designated identities. 
Applying identity as the “the missing link” 
between learning and its sociocultural context
In the remainder of this article we put the narratively defined identity to work 
in the attempt to check whether it fulfills its promise as a tool for fathoming the 
mechanism through which the wider community, with its distinct cultural-discursive 
traditions, impinges on its members’ learning. This is done in the context of the study 
that involved native and immigrant Israeli mathematics students. In what follows we 
bring an “executive summary” of several highlights of this study (full report can be 
found in Prusak, 2003).
The study and its initial findings
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The research project focused on one 11th grade class that followed an advanced 
mathematics program. 9 out of the 19 students were NewComers – recent 
immigrants from big cities in the former Soviet Union such as Moscow, Kiev and 
Tbilisi. The rest were native Israelis, whom we call OldTimers. All of the students 
came from well-educated families. The second author, a one-time immigrant from the 
Soviet Union, served as the teacher.  In the course of the entire 1998/1999 school 
year all classroom processes were meticulously observed and documented. 
Numerous interviews with the students, with their parents and with other teachers 
constituted additional data.  
The salience of the differences between the learning processes of the two 
groups exceeded our expectations. We were also astonished by the striking across-
tasks consistency of the intra-group homogeneity and of the inter-group disparities. 
For the sake of brevity, in the rest of this report we will draw on just two special cases 
which we regard as fully representative of their respective groups: the case of one 
OldTimer and one NewComer, whom we shall call Leah and Sonya, respectively. 
Although according to the common measures both girls could be deemed 
successful in their mathematical learning, they differed substantially in the way they 
learned. Thus, for example, while studying independently with the help of a textbook 
and a worksheet, Leah typically executed all the auxiliary tasks specified by the 
teacher and was careful to produce written evidence of this work. Sonya, in contrast, 
did not bother to leave any records of what she did. On the other hand, her self-
reports revealed a much more complex process of learning, one that included 
repeated self-testing, self-correcting, and attempts at finding her own organization of 
the learned material. Clearly, whatever she did in the course of learning was done for 
herself, according to her own assessment of its importance. For Leah, the teacher 
seemed to be the ultimate addressee. 
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These and numerous similar observations led us to the conclusion that Leah’s 
learning was ritualized, that is, was motivated mainly by the student’s wish to adhere 
to rules of the game with which, for social reasons, the girl felt obliged to comply. 
This learning was thought of as an activity the importance of which was in its very 
performance. In contrast, Sonya strove toward substantial learning - the learning, 
effects of which would outlast classroom activities and could be gauged according to 
criteria independent of the tastes or personal opinions of a particular teacher.  Her 
wish to attain such lasting effect could be observed all along our extensive study  and 
was evidenced by her constant backtracking and self-examination, by her 
conspicuous preference for individual work, by her care for the appropriateness of 
her mathematical expression, and more generally, by her insistence on following all 
those rules of communication which, according to her own assessment (as opposed 
to that of the teacher, for example) could count as genuinely ‘mathematical.’
Not surprisingly, there seemed to be a tight correspondence between the way 
the two students learned and the effectiveness of their learning. Thus, for example, 
on one previously unannounced test, Sonya was fully successful in reproducing the 
proof, which she learned on her own a few days earlier, whereas Leah failed to even 
formulate the theorem (admittedly, this failure was an extreme event in her school 
career, since her test performances were generally rather successful). Here, as 
almost everywhere else, the two girls were fully representative of their respective 
groups both in the way they learned and in the results they attained. 
Linking learning to identity
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The striking differences between the OldTimers’ and NewComers’ learning called for 
explanation. Although we had a basis on which to claim the existence of certain 
systematic differences in the teaching practices in the former Soviet Union and in 
Israel,7 these differences did not seem to tell the whole story. A teaching approach 
might have been responsible for the NewComers’ acquaintance with certain 
techniques, but this fact, per se, did not account for the students’ willingness to use 
these methods. We felt that to complete the explanation, we needed to clarify why 
the participants of our study were among those students who actually took advantage 
of the learning opportunities created by their teachers.  
Yet another obvious explanation for the effectiveness of the NewComers’ 
learning  was that their immigrant status amplified their need for success.8 Since, 
however, being an immigrant is a part of one’s identity, this conjecture harked us 
back to the broader question of how our findings can be accounted for on the basis of 
the claim about  learning as closing the gap between actual and designated 
identities. This broader consideration was certainly necessary if we were to be able 
to explain why school mathematics was singled out by the immigrant participants of 
our study as the medium through which to exercise their pursuit of excellence. 
Indeed, no other immigrant population, of which Israel has always had many, 
displayed a comparable propensity for mathematics. 
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To map NewComers’ and OldTimers’ designated identities, we listened to 
their stories about themselves told to their teacher on various occasions. True, what 
we really needed were self-addressed stories of the type AAA rather than  AATeacher, 
because this former type of narrative was more likely to interact significantly with 
one’s actions. This preference notwithstanding, we were confident that the teacher-
addressed designated identities would prove informative, especially if they displayed 
diversity paralleling the observed differences in learning. Further, we made certain 
deductions regarding the NewComers’ and OldTimers’ expectations from themselves 
on the basis of their self-referential remarks, of their comments about others (e.g. the 
teacher of fellow students), and of our own observations on the ways they acted. As 
a background, we used interviews with the students’ parents and with other teachers. 
What was found with the help of this multifarious evidence displayed intra-group 
uniformity and inter-group differences comparable in their salience to those observed 
previously in the context of the students’ learning. As before, these findings will now 
be exemplified with the representative cases of Leah and Sonya. Of necessity, we 
will follow with some generalizations. Because of the limitation of space, we will talk 
about what students said rather than reproducing their exact words. Aware of the 
limitations of such presentation, we urge the reader to remember that what follows is 
a story about stories: it is our story of the NewComers’ and OldTimers’ own 
narratives, and not authorless assertions about “who these students really were” (that 
is, ours are stories of the type researchers[AATeacher]readers and researchers[AAA]readers, rather than 
of the type researchersAreaders). 
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Probably the most obvious critical element of Sonya’s vision of herself in the 
future was her professional career.  Her tendency to identify herself mainly by her 
designated profession of medical doctor stood in stark contrast to Leah’ declarations 
on her need  “to be happy” and the latter interviewee’s adamant refusal to specify 
any concrete plans for the future.  The professions desired by Sonya, as well as 
those mentioned by other NewComers (e.g. computer scientist, medical doctor, 
engineer) were all related to mathematics, and this appeared to account for these 
students’ special mathematical proclivity. And yet, there seemed to be more to these 
students’ inclination for mathematics than just the wish to promote their professional 
prospects. According to the NewComers’ frequent remarks, the special attraction of 
mathematics was in the fact that its rules could be seen as universal rather than 
specific to a particular place or culture. While explaining why she chose to learn 
advanced mathematics, Sonya, like the other NewComers, spoke about the 
knowledge of mathematics as a necessary condition for her becoming “a fully-fledged 
human being.” We have thus reason to claim that mathematical fluency as such, and 
not just anything that could be gained through it, constituted the critical element in 
Sonya’s and other NewComers’ 1st P designated identities. In contrast Leah, in 
explaining her choice of advanced mathematics course, stressed the fact that 
matriculating in this subject with high grades would largely increase her chances for 
being accepted to the university. In other words, if Leah was attracted to 
mathematics it was mainly, perhaps exclusively, because of its role as a gatekeeper. 
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To sum up, the designated identities of Sonya and of her fellow NewComers 
portrayed their heroes as exemplars of what the NewComers themselves described 
as “the complete humans,” with this last term implied to have a timeless, universal, 
generally accepted meaning, and with mathematical fluency being indispensable for 
the completeness. In contrast, Leah and the other OldTimers expected to have their 
future life shaped by their own wishes and needs, which, at this point in time, were 
seen as fluid and, in the longer run, unforeseeable. This also points to a distinct 
meta-level difference between the two groups: Whereas the NewComers saw their 
highly prescriptive designated identities as given and apparently immutable, just like 
the mathematics they wanted to master, the OldTimers’ expected their 1st P identities 
to evolve with the world in tandem.
In accord with our expectations, all this seemed to account, at least in part, for 
our former findings about the difference between Leah’s and Sonya’s learning. 
Sonya, just like the other NewComers, needed mathematical fluency in order to close 
the critical gap between her actual and designated identities. For Leah and for the 
other OldTimers, this fluency was something to be shown upon request, like an 
entrance ticket that could be thrown away after use and that had no value of its own. 
Since mathematical skills did not constitute a critical element of the OldTimers’ 
designated identities, these skills’ absence or insufficiency did not create any 
substantial learning-fuelling tension. 
Linking identity to the sociocultural context of learning 
Where does the disparity between NewComers’ and OldTimers’ designated identities  
come from? was the last question we had to address in order to complete our story of 
designated identity as a link between learning and its sociocultural setting. More 
specifically, we needed to account for the fact that mathematical fluency constituted 
the critical element of the NewComers’ designated identities but did not seem to play 
this role in the identities of OldTimers.
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The first thing to say in this context is that given the NewComers’ immigrant 
status, their being well versed in mathematics appeared of a redemptive value: The 
universality of mathematical skills was likely to constitute an antidote to these 
students’ sense of local exclusion. To put it in terms of identity, we conjecture that 
whereas NewComers were bound to identify themselves as outsiders to their local 
environment, mathematical prowess was one of those properties that compensated 
them with the more prestigious, place-independent status of “people of education and 
culture.”9 
Clearly, the idea that education at large, and the fluency in mathematics in 
particular, might counterbalance the less advantageous elements of their identity was 
not the young NewComers’ original invention. In general, what the participants of our 
study expected for themselves was not unlike what their parents and grandparents 
wished for them. This is what transpired in both groups from the students’ assertions 
about the full accord between their own and their parents’ expectations, and from 
their remarks about the parents’ impact on their choices. This said, there was an 
important difference between our two populations. Unlike in the case of NewComers, 
the OldTimers’ parents were described as willingly limiting the area of their influence 
and leaving most decisions in the young people’s own hands. We also found it quite 
telling that parents were rarely mentioned in the OldTimers’ autobiographical 
testimonies, whereas the NewComers’ accounts were replete with statements on the 
elders’ authority and with explicit and implicit assertions on the parents’ all-important 
role in their children’s education.  Obviously, OldTimers’ parents’ stories about their 
children’s future were not as prescriptive as those of the NewComers, nor was the 
influence of these stories equally significant. 
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Narratives about education as a universal social lever and about knowledge 
of mathematics as one of the most important ingredients of education evidently 
constituted a vital part of the NewComers’ cultural tradition.  In their native countries, 
their families belonged to the Jewish minority. According to what we were told both 
by the students and by their parents, these families had typically identified 
themselves as locally excluded but globally “at home” thanks to their fine education. 
Their sense of only partial attachment to the ambient community was likely the 
reason for the young people’s relative closeness to their families. In the interviews, 
both the parents and the children sounded fully reconciled with their status of local 
outsiders. Proud of their cultural background and convinced about its universal value, 
they seemed to consider this kind of exclusion as the inevitable price for, and thus a 
sign of, the more prestigious, more global cultural membership. It seems, therefore, 
that the NewComers’ identities as local outsiders destined to overcome the exclusion 
with the help of place-independent cultural assets such as mathematics were shaped 
by their parents’ and grandparents’ stories prior to the students’ immigration to Israel. 
Since significant narrators can count as voices of community, all these 
findings corroborate the claim that designated identities are products of collective 
storytelling – of both deliberate molding by others and of incontrollable diffusion of 
narratives that run in families and in communities. This assertion completes our 
empirical instantiation of the claim on designated identity as “a pivot between the 
social and the individual” aspects of learning (Wenger, 1998, p. 145).
Concluding remark: The promise of the “narrative turn”
Telling identities 28
Summarizing her reflections on the delicate trade-off between advantages 
and imperfections of the notions of culture and identity, Norma Gonzales ventured 
the prediction: “If I were to engage in a prescient attempt to name the direction of 
future research in anthropology and education, my bet would be the theory and 
practice of language ideologies” (Gonzales, 1999, p. 433). One of her reasons for 
envisioning this particular development was the conviction that the discursive turn 
would increase the researchability of social phenomena: Questions about intra- and 
inter-personal mechanisms would reincarnate into queries about the dynamics of 
discourses, which would be helpful, because  “people’s ideas about language use 
are readily accessible to researchers and practitioners” (p. 434). On these pages, we 
hope to have started turning this prediction into reality.  
The key move was to equate identity-building with storytelling. The difference 
between identity as a “thing in the world” versus as a discursive construct is subtle. 
The kind of data the narratively-minded researcher analyzes in her studies is the 
same as everybody else’s: these are stories people tell about themselves or about 
others to their friends, teachers, parents, children, bosses, and researchers. The only 
distinctive feature of the present narrative approach is that rather than treat the 
stories as windows to another entity that stays unchanged when “the stories 
themselves” evolve, the adherent of the narrative perspective is interested in the 
stories as such, accepting them for what they appear to be: words that are taken 
seriously and shape one’s actions. While analyzing the different narratives’ incessant 
co-molding, their dialectic interaction with people’s deeds, their flow from one 
generation to another, and their back-and-forth movement between community level 
and the level of an individual, this scholar is uniquely positioned to answer the time-
honored question presented in the beginning of this article: Why do different people 
act differently in the same situations and why, in spite of these differences, different  
individuals’ actions may also reveal a distinct family resemblance?
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1 According to the leading Israeli newspaper Haaretz, “Approximately 200 thousand children immigrated to Israel in 11 
years, most of them from the former Soviet Union; they constitute 15% of the Israeli youth”(31.08.2001).
2 This conjecture should not be misread as saying that the immigrants from the former Soviet Union are generally more 
successful in mathematics than the rest of Israeli population. As reported in Haaretz (2 August 1996), “There are 
[immigrant] children who arrive at the highest places in international competitions in mathematics and physics and 
thanks to them, Israel climbed from 24th to 13th place in the 1995 international championship.” 
3 A few pages earlier (p.110) the author said: “Any combination that can get recognized as a certain ‘kind of person’ 
(e.g. a certain kind of African American, radical feminist, doctor, patient, skinhead) is what I call a ‘Discourse’… with a 
capital ‘d’… Discourses are ways of being ‘certain kinds of people’.” 
4 This concern is not unlike the one raised by Guttirez and Rogoff (2003) who make a case against speaking in terms of 
individual traits and propose that “individuals’ and groups’ experience in activities—not their traits—becomes the 
focus” of research (p. 19). 
5 Through the ways we talk we populate our worlds with entities supposedly outlasting our actions. With words we turn 
processes into objects, into the permanent entities to which our actions are applied or which result from these actions 
(Sfard, 1991, 1994); it is also with words that we reify the discursive subjects – the implementers of the actions. 
6 Bakhtin (1999) spoke about utterances and words rather than stories.
7 The second author of this study, based on such sources as her personal experience as a student and as a teacher in 
Belarus, her survey of Russian mathematics textbooks, and her interviews with immigrant mathematics teachers who 
were asked to compare the way of teaching and learning mathematics in the former Soviet Union and in Israel, claims in 
her dissertation that in the former Soviet Union, unlike in Israel, some  learning techniques were the explicit object of 
instruction. 
8 As observed by Ogbu (1992), the status of minority is a doubly-edged sword. As shown by empirical findings, 
belonging to minority may, in some cases, motivate hard work and eventual success, whereas in some others it would 
have an opposite effect. Immigrants, whom Ogbu calls “voluntary minorities” as opposed to those whose minority 
status was imposed rather than chosen, are more likely than the others to belong to this former group.
9 In colloquial Russian discourses, the word culture (kultura) is often used in an evaluative, normative way, rather than 
to signify a default element of human condition. 
